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Abstract
Dissatisfaction with traditional accounting-based performance measures has spawned a number
of alternatives, of which Economic Value Added (EVA) is clearly the most prominent. How can
we tell which performance measures best capture managerial contributions to value? There
is currently a heated debate among practitioners as to whether the new performance measures
have a higher correlation with stock values and returns than do traditional accounting earnings.
Academic researchers have instead relied on the variance of performance measures to gauge their
relative accuracy.
Our analysis pits EVA against earnings as two candidate performance measures. We use a
relatively standard principal-agent model, but recognize that while the variability of each measure is
observable, their exact information (signal) content is not. The model provides a formal method for
ascertaining the relative value of such measures based on two distinct uses of the stock price. First,
as is well-known, prices provide a noisy measure of managerial value-added. Our novel insight is that
stock prices can also reveal the signal content of alternative accounting-based performance measures.
We then show how to combine stock prices, earnings, and EVA to produce an optimally weighted
compensation scheme. Surprisingly, we nd that the simple correlation between EVA or earnings
and stock returns is a reasonably reliable guide to their value as an incentive contracting tool.
This is not because stock returns are themselves an ideal performance measure, rather it is because
correlation places appropriate weights on both the signal and noise components of alternative
measures.
We then calibrate the theoretical improvement in incentive contracts from optimally using EVA
in addition to accounting earnings at the rm and industry level. That is, we empirically estimate
the \value-added" of EVA by rm and industry. These estimates are positive and signicant in
predicting which rms have actually adopted EVA as an internal performance measure.1 Introduction
There is near unanimity in the belief that performance-based compensation is a critically important
corporate governance mechanism. Opinions of how to design the compensation contract dier
widely. Some argue that managers should simply be paid according to stock price performance
(Jensen and Murphy (1990b) and Rappaport (1986)). However, others argue that stock-based
compensation imposes excessive risk on the manager, owing to market-wide movements (Sloan
(1993)) and because even rm-specic returns reﬂect factors beyond managers' control (Lambert,
1993). Paul (1992) points out an additional weakness with stock prices; they tend to aggregate
relevant information ineciently for compensation purposes. These latter arguments imply that
rms may be able to improve incentives by relying directly on other measures of performance which
more accurately reﬂect the manager's marginal contribution to rm value. But which measures
accomplish this task, and how should they be combined to produce the best possible incentive
contract?
Practitioner interest in the above question has outstripped even the academic interest. A large
number of major consulting rms produce and aggressively market their own accounting-based
performance measures. Examples include Stern Stewart's EVA (Economic Value Added), Holt's
CFROI (Cash Flow Return on Investment), Boston Consulting Group's TBR (Total Business Re-
turn), McKinsey's Economic Prot, and LEK/Alcar's SVA (Shareholder Value Added).1 Intense
competition has arisen among these various rms for the lucrative business of designing and imple-
menting compensation schemes aimed at increasing shareholder wealth. In marketing their services,
all of the above rms provide a list of major successful clients. Stern Stewart, Boston Consulting
Group, and LEK/Alcar also make the claim that their proprietary performance measure correlates
more closely with stock returns than do either traditional accounting measures or the measures
of rival rms, allegedly making it a more desirable compensation tool.2 The correlation-rationale
appears to carry some weight in practice, judging from examples such as the Crane Company's
March 1995 Proxy Statement disclosing new executive pay based on EVA:
Compared to such common performance measures as return on capital, return on equity,
growth in earnings per share, and growth in cash ﬂow, EVA has the highest statistical
correlation with the creation of value for shareholders.3
1See Randy Myers, \Measure for Measure", CFO Magazine, November 1997.
2See O'Byrne (1997) Boston Consulting Group (1996), and LEK/Alcar (1998). A recent academic literature has
emerged to critically examine such claims. Biddle et al (1997) perform the most systematic study and nd that, in
stark contrast to O'Byrne (1997), earnings appear to \outperform" EVA in explaining stock price movements.
3Reported in Wallace (1998). Companies such as Boeing, Clorox, and National Semiconductor also mention the
importance of a high correlation between performance measures and stock prices (see Davis (1996)).
1Since the avowed goal of the new performance measures is to increase shareholder wealth, the
correlation of such measures with stock returns has an obvious appeal. However, as originally
shown by Gjesdal (1981), a strong statistical correlation with stock returns does not establish that
a performance measure adds value. No measure of performance could ever have a higher statistical
correlation with stock returns than the return itself. Thus, if correlation was the only goal, rms
should solely use their stock price for compensation and ignore all other measures. However, as
argued above, stock returns might be an excessively noisy and even misleading measure of managers'
value-added.4
These arguments seem to suggest that an ideal performance measure would not be too closely
related to the stock price. However, if this is the goal, there are an innite number of truly
irrelevant and inappropriate measures that t the criterion of being unrelated to the stock price.
In light of these conﬂicting arguments, how are we then to judge the value of alternative performance
measures?
To answer this question, we use an explicit incentive contracting and valuation model. This
allows us to go beyond the polar cases, since no actual performance measure has an R2 of either
zero or one.5 The model reminds us that what matters for compensation is the signal-to-noise
ratio (see Banker and Datar (1989)). Our rst contribution is to incorporate the fact that while it
is relatively easy to measure the volatility or \noise" content of alternative performance measures,
the \signal" content of such measures is not directly observable by researchers and, most likely, by
the rms that use them. We simply assume that we don't know all of the relevant attributes of
the available performance measures, and show that a performance measure's correlation with the
stock price indirectly reveals some of these features.6 Therefore, we show how to use alternative
accounting-based performance measures together along with stock returns to empirically determine
their signal-to-noise ratio. Consequently, we are able to state the value-added of each performance
4An alternative argument is that, unlike stock prices, EVA and other measures can be decomposed to the divisional
level and beyond. It can then be argued that EVA serves as a divisional surrogate for the (nonexistent) stock price.
Unfortunately, the rm-level correlation between an performance measure and stock prices cannot establish its value
at lower levels of the organization. The divisional level measures could be extremely biased and dysfunctional, but
as long as these biases \wash-out" at the rm level, we will be unable to detect them. Additionally, the Paul (1992)
argument implies that even a perfect division-level surrogate for the stock price would not necessarily be ideal for
incentive compensation.
5A theoretically ideal performance measure would measure eort without noise and allow a forcing contract.
Such a measure would have zero variability in equilibrium, but would also be extremely sensitive to any changes in
managers' value-added. The R
2 of such a measure is either zero or undened.
6There are other examples in the literature where the rm learns from the capital market or other performance
measures. Dye and Sridhar (1998) examine how rms' strategic decision making can be improved by observing stock
market reactions to proposed strategic initiatives. Dye (1999) builds a formal model that helps us interpret popular
management concepts, such as TQM and the \Balanced Scorecard". He argues that when there exists uncertainty
about what drives rm value, managers should experiment with various measures of performance as a means of
learning about which one is most critical to the value creation process.
2measure, entirely in terms of observables. The relative variance of alternative measures is clearly
a poor measure of their value since this ignores dierences in the signal content of each measure.
The value-added is also not equivalent to the relative size of the coecient obtained by regressing
stock returns on the accounting measures, echoing Paul's (1992) results. Surprisingly, the relative
ability of each measure to explain abnormal stock returns (i.e., its R2) fares far better. While it
is not a perfect measure of the incremental value-added of a performance measure, it has the right
ordinal properties. Holding the noise content xed, an increase in the signal will increase the R2.
And holding the signal content xed, an increase in noise will decrease the R2. This turns out
to be nearly enough for the purpose of determining the relative value of two accounting measures.
Thus, our model suggests that despite its rather obvious weaknesses, there is substantial value in
the debate over which performance measure has the larger R2.
Following the above, we attempt to integrate the theory and empirical tests in a meaningful
way. We test our approach by computing the value-added by using EVA according to our theory,
along with the relative R2 for over 500 US rms between 1979-98. Consistent with the ndings
of Biddle et al (1997) and our results on the value of R2 weightings, EVA adds little or no value
for a large number of rms. However, there are signicant dierences across rms and industries.
For example, the percentage reduction of the variance of an optimal compensation plan using both
EVA and earnings relative to a plan written only on earnings is just 2.2% for the Tobacco Products
industry (SIC two-digit code 21). However, this same variance reduction is 32.6% for the Food
and Kindred Products industry (SIC 20).7
This heterogeneity in the value-added of EVA raises the question of whether EVA and related
measures are in fact more likely to be adopted by rms for which EVA's marginal value is greater.
To investigate this, we use the lists of rms that have adopted EVA or a related \economic prot"
measure for incentive purposes from the studies of Wallace (1997), Hogan and Lewis (1999), and
Kleiman (1999). Our model does surprisingly well. For example, no rm in the Tobacco
Products industry has formally adopted EVA in our sample, whereas 11.5% of the rms in the
Food and Kindred Products industry have adopted EVA. In our analysis of actual EVA adoption
decisions, we also control for other plausible determinants of the value-added of EVA, including
capital intensity, size, leverage, prior performance, and Tobin's q. Any capital-intensive rm would
seem an obvious candidate to adopt EVA. Large rms, for which the agency problems may be most
pronounced and xed costs of adoption loom less large, may nd EVA more valuable, as would
7These results can be found in Tables 6 and 7
3any rm that has suered from poor historical performance. On the other hand, rms that are
highly leveraged may need EVA less as debt provides its own incentives to operate eciently (see
Jensen (1989)). However, our empirical analysis shows that only capital-intensity is associated
with the adoption decision; measures such as size, leverage, past performance, or Tobin's q have
little ability to distinguish those rms that do and those that do not adopt EVA. Thus, our method
for measuring the value-added of EVA appears itself to add value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and characterizes
the problem we explore. Section 3 presents the formal empirical structure for testing our formal
model of compensation when performance measures have unknown attributes. Section 4 provides
our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model Setup
In this section, we develop a model of managerial compensation design. Our goal is to determine the
marginal value of adding the EVA performance measure to an existing earnings-based compensation
plan.8 As is standard, we require all measures to be used optimally. Less standard is our ability
to express the results in terms of observable quantities.
We model a single rm run by a risk-averse manager. Fundamental rm value is determined by
both the manager's eort choices and randomness, where this latter component represents elements
beyond the manager's control. We assume that there are two dimensions of managerial eort,
denoted ac and af. Strictly speaking, the action ac can be captured by (accounting) performance
measures, while the action af is not revealed by our candidate accounting measures. This action will
be captured by another performance measure, then revealed through stock prices. We introduce
these two types of eort in order to distinguish between two uses of the stock price. First, it
represents a direct measure of af, and second, it serves as an additional source of information
about the competing accounting measures of ac. The rm's terminal value is given by
Xc + Xf =( ac + c)+( af + f),
where ai 2 [0;1), for i 2f c;fg, are the manager's (unobservable) eort choices across ac and af,
and i is noise, with i s N(0;2
i )f o ri 2f c;fg. The terms c and f are independent shocks
8It is important to note that our analysis is directly amenable to any pair-wise comparison of performance measures.
We focus on only two accounting measures since we are interested in characterizing the battle over which accounting
measure { EVA or earnings { is better for incentive compensation.
4to the manager's eorts, with variances 2
c and 2
f, respectively. Naturally, these need not have
zero mean, but are so modelled here for convenience. Observe that we have set the unadjusted
sensitivities of the manager's two action choices both equal to one. This is just a normalization as
we will allow the cost of the dierent types of eort, and therefore their value marginal products,
to vary arbitrarily.
The manager has utility that is separable in wealth and eort, and has a reservation utility level
normalized to zero. We assume that the manager has negative exponential utility over wealth, with
a coecient of risk-aversion given by r. Further, the general cost of eort is given by C(ac;a f).9
Risk neutral shareholders design the manager's compensation contract to maximize their wealth,
subject to the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Given the unobservability
of both eort decisions, shareholders must rely on performance-based compensation arrangements.
Hampering these eorts in our model is the assumption that the underlying value of the rm
(Xc+Xf)i snot directly observable. Rather, there exists a set of observable performance measures
which oer noisy, yet informative estimates of the individual components of rm value.
2.1 Available Performance Measures and the Stock Price
We assume that there are two competing (accounting) measures of ac, Y1 and Y2,a n do n em e a s u r e
of af given by Yf. The two accounting performance measures are observable to all and contracts
can be written on them directly. These measures are given by
Y1 = 1Xc + "1
Y2 = 2Xc + "2;
where "1  N(0;!2
1)a n d"2  N(0;!2
2). For generality, we allow these errors to have a (possibly)
non-zero covariance given by Cov("1;" 2)="1"2!1!2.
The parameters 1 and 2 are positive, deterministic scalars that represent the marginal value
of the performance measure. In particular, they determine what proportion of the manager's
contribution to rm value through ac is successfully captured by the performance measure. At the
heart of our paper is the acknowledgment that these parameters need not be known a priori. The
motivation for this specication is as follows. It is apparent that in the performance specication of
9These assumptions are made solely for simplicity. Since our focus is on relative, rather than absolute performance
weights, we can ignore dierences in risk aversion or eort costs. Any dierences would simply carry through to
our Banker and Datar (1989) ratio of optimal performance weights. However, for interesting work on the eects of
manager risk aversion on optimal compensation contracts, see Haubrich (1994) and Garen (1994).
5Yj = jXc + "j, \false" value creation is potentially registered in either measure by the error term
"j. Naturally, these errors could dier across performance measures. Similarly, the unknown and
potentially nonequal j's capture the fact that our accounting measures might also fail to register
value-increases that have in fact occurred. That is, these measures can, and most likely do, have
dierential \signal content" as well. Thus, we model a situation where performance measures are
freely available for contracting purposes, yet their value in this regard may be uncertain.
The above formulation is in part an attempt to capture the implicit logic behind the \R2
debate". If all practitioners agreed on the properties of alternative performance measures, there
would be no reason to argue about which is most closely related to stock prices. One would simply
demonstrate that EVA (or a competing measure) is consistent with basic valuation principles while
accounting earnings are not. However, actual performance measurement involves both noise and
judgement. As Stern Stewart and other practitioners have implicitly recognized, the theoretical
argument in favor of EVA or related measures needs buttressing by empirical evidence, such as the
relationship between the performance measure and stock prices. Our model indicates exactly what
kind of evidence is needed and how it should be used.
For the case of earnings, it is well-known that earnings changes have a substantially lower
variance than do stock returns, even after removing market eects from the stock returns. But
if earnings had a  value of one, then they would be more variable than fundamental value due
to the noise term ". While this can be explained away by assuming that this eect stems solely
from variations in future value (Yf) or simple stock price noise, it is equally likely that earnings
reports suppresses information, as well as noise. A similar argument can be made for EVA. First,
changes in EVA are far less volatile than abnormal stock returns in Biddle et al's (1997) sample,
as well as in our sample. Second, EVA's adjustments to reported earnings are unlikely to undo all
of the conservativeness in accounting earnings. Finally, and perhaps most important, the equity
cost of capital used in Stern Stewart's capital charge is estimated with a great deal of noise.10 In
response, Stern Stewart appear to advocate smoothing the capital charge across rms and over
time, as evidenced by the following excerpt:
Coca-Cola, (a prominent Stern Stewart client), uses 12% as its single cost of capital
worldwide, expressed in dollars. Why 12%? Because it's 1% a month.11
Our formulation resembles that used by Sloan (1993) in allowing accounting numbers to be
10See Fama and French (1997) for an examination of the time-variation in industry costs of capital.
11See Ehbar (1999).
6related to fundamental value by a multiplicative constant. However, his approach critically relied
on the extreme assumption that abnormal stock returns are a noiseless measure of Xc. We allow
for a more realistic setting in which all measures are noisy and at the outset of the analysis, we
don't know all of the relevant attributes of the available performance measures of ac. However, we
do allow for the possibility that there exists another valuable piece of information. In addition to
the two current value performance measures, there is a measure of af given by
Yf = Xf + "f;
where "f  N(0;!2
f). We assume that Yf is observed by capital market investors and hence, re-
vealed through the stock price. In equilibrium, the stock price (P) is set by competitive, risk-neutral
traders who observe Y1, Y2 and Yf, and understand the statistical properties of each measure.12
This specication implies that the capital market participants are able to obtain accurate estimates
of the variances Y1 and Y2. Access to a suciently long time-series of observations on Y1 and Y2
would be sucient for such a purpose.
The measure Yf could very well represent information that is privately observed by some capital
market investors. However, it should be noted that our analysis could readily accommodate
the assumption that the rm's shareholders (who design the manager's wage contract) could also
observe Yf. In fact, they could also observe the 1 and 2 parameters. What is implicit in our
analysis is that the shareholders design a contract using the two accounting measures and stock
price, and treat Yf as noncontractible. Our contribution builds on the reality that as empirical
researches, we cannot observe 1, 2,o rYf.
Given this information structure, the stock price is
P = E(Xc + Xf j Y1;Y 2;Y f)+,( 1 )
where   N(0;2
) captures the possibility that market prices have additional errors that are
independent of fundamentals.13 Note that since expected returns are zero, any non-zero returns
are abnormal returns reﬂecting innovations in the measures Y1, Y2, Yf or the error term :
2.2 Optimal Contracts
For incentive contracting purposes, the rm's shareholders are interested in the manager's contribu-
tions to rm value through ac and af.I f 1 and 2 were known, the stock price would not provide
12We assume that the discount rate is zero.
13For simplicity, we are ignoring the fact that the manager's pay comes out of the stock price. Inclusion of this
does not qualitatively alter the results, although the algebra becomes increasingly tedious.
7a valuable signal of the manager's choice of ac. The reason is that the stock price's estimate of ac
is based only on measures Y1 and Y2, which can already be used directly for contracting purposes.
In this case, the stock price is only a useful surrogate for the manager's choice of af.





for i 2f 1;2g. Restricting the set of feasible wage contracts to be linear, we can then write an
optimal contract directly on the transformed performance measures by solving for
w(Y1;Y 2;P f)=W + γ1Ψ1 + γ2Ψ2 + [P − E[PjY1;Y 2;Y f]], (3)
where W represents the xed wage.14 4
Naturally, the absolute weights in this wage contract depend on the explicit functional form
for the manager's cost of eort and risk-aversion coecient. However, as we know from Banker
and Datar (1989) for the case where the manager has a single eort decision (here ac), the optimal
relative weights on the two accounting measures Y1 and Y2 are independent of these considerations.
Their result carries over to our multi-task setting since we assume that both Y1 and Y2 are noisy
measures of the same action on the part of the manager.15 More importantly, the relative weights







Va r(Ψ2) − Cov(Ψ1;Ψ2)
Va r(Ψ1) − Cov(Ψ1;Ψ2)
.( 4 )
3 Extracting Information from Stock Prices
There is, however, a fundamental dierence between the optimal relative weights when we do not
observe 1 and 2.W e d o not observe the additional information 1 and 2 necessary to construct
the measures Ψ1 and Ψ2 in the rst place. In this section, we develop our formal framework for
using stock market information to elicit estimates of each performance measure's signal content, as
well as estimate a performance measure's marginal value in being added to an existing compensation
contract.
14We will only consider linear compensation contracts. See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) for justication of this
approach.
15See Feltham and Xie (1994) for a characterization of the more general case where measures capture multiple
aspects of eort.
8W ec a no b t a i na ne s t i m a t eo fi,f o ri 2f 1;2g, through the regression










This regression provides an estimate of i in the form of the coecient i. It is important to
recognize that i understates the true i because Va r(P) > 2
c. This is apparent given that the
stock price depends not just on Xc (as captured by Y1 and Y2), but also on Xf (revealed through
Yf) and additional noise, given by the variance of . Sloan (1993) undertook an analysis similar
to that above but assumed that the variance of abnormal stock returns were in fact equal to 2
c
(which is the variance of Xc). Under that strict assumption,  oered an unbiased estimate of .
As pointed out by Lambert (1993), this assumption is unrealistic and in fact undercuts the entire
exercise since it immediately implies that the abnormal return should be the only performance
measure used.
Naturally, since we don't observe i, our estimate of i =
Cov(Yi;P)
Va r (P) r e m a i n sl e s st h a ni d e a l .
Moreover, we should state clearly that we do not claim to solve the above errors-in-variables problem
and obtain unbiased estimates of the i. When the errors ("1;" 2) in our accounting performance
measures are correlated ("1"2 6= 0), we are unable to completely decompose the variance of the
stock price into the components that reﬂect ac, af, and noise. Fortunately, as we now show, we
do not need to solve the errors-in-variables problem to obtain an unbiased measure of the relative
optimal weights on our accounting performance measures. The reason is simply that the degree of






which oers us an estimate of i, denoted b i,
b i = gi,( 6 )
for i 2f 1;2g, that carries the same constant g in both b 1 and b 2. This allows us to express the
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1Va r(Y2) − 2Cov(Y1;Y 2)










where  denotes the simple correlation coecient.
The last two expressions are stated entirely in terms of observables. While there is no single
statistical concept that captures all the elements of the optimal compensation ratio, it is quite
closely related to the ratio of the simple R2 obtained from regressing stock returns on the two





. By contrast, the ratio of relative variances
is not fundamentally related to the optimal weights, and later we show that this is true empirically
as well. Similarly, if the rm were to ignore the accounting performance measures and tie the
managers' pay exclusively to the stock price, the two measures would implicitly receive weights
of 1 and 2, respectively. The problem with the stock market weights is that they place too
much emphasis on relative variance. To see this, observe that the ratio
1
2 can be written as
Y1PY2
Y2PY1
. This is a special case of Paul's (1992) general demonstration that the stock market need
not aggregate information eciently for incentive purposes.
3.1 EVA's Contribution to Ecient Contracting
We now use our methodology from above to predict which rms will explicitly adopt EVA or a
related measure. For this purpose, we need to characterize the marginal value (or value-added)
of using EVA in an optimal wage contract versus not using it all. In general, the value-added
of using a second performance measure in conjunction with an existing measure in an incentive-
based wage contract is a function of the dierence between the variance of the existing measure
and the variance of the optimally weighted composite measure. For our purposes, we wish to
assess the marginal contribution of adding EVA (Y1) to a compensation plan written only on












2 Ψ2,w h e r eγ
1 and γ
2 are given by (7). The marginal contribution is
then strictly increasing in the dierence between the variance of the transformed earnings measure
(Va r(Y2=2)=Va r(Ψ2)) and the variance of the optimal composite measure (Va r(Ψ
c)). With
this hand, we have the following result.
10Proposition 1
The value-added of adding EVA to a compensation plan written on earnings is given by
Va r(Ψ2)−Va r(Ψ
c). While this expression includes the unobservable term g = Va r(P)=2
c, the per-
centage value-added,
(Va r (Ψ2)−Va r (Ψ
c))
Va r(Ψ2) , can be expressed entirely in terms of the simple correlations
Y2P, Y1P; and Y1Y2:
The above result translates the relative weighting characterized in (7) into the total value-added
of the alternative measures. This reﬂects the extent to which the rm can reduce the risk imposed
on executives without sacricing incentives.
There is one remaining diculty with using Proposition 1 to predict the decision to adopt
EVA. In our framework, we envision the rms optimally combining the new performance measures
with their existing ones. Stern Stewart advocate that EVA be used to the exclusion of traditional
measures such as earnings. However, it is certainly possible that in the process of customizing
EVA for each client, they end up with a measure like ours that retains the valuable portions of
earnings and combines it optimally with the unique features of EVA. While the result on the value
of using either earnings or EVA in isolation in an optimal wage scheme is informative, one could











2 Ψ2 is closely akin to what rms
might do in reality. For example, in deciding how to handle their R&D expenses, Federal-Mogul
corporation debated between expensing them (as is done in traditional Earnings) or capitalizing
them (as is advocated by Stern Stewart in EVA). In the end, they chose to capitalize them as this
method oered the highest correlation (R2) with stock price changes. We would interpret this as
giving low weight to earnings (i.e., low γ
1) and giving more weight to EVA (i.e., high γ
2)i nΨ 
c.
Unfortunately, with the exception of a few stylized examples, we have no way to ascertain when
such weighting takes place when rms adopt EVA. Fortunately, as we now show, there is a close
relationship between the value-added of EVA as part of an optimal performance measure, and its
value when used to the exclusion of earnings.
Proposition 2
The value to the rm from using EVA (Y1) on its own, relative to that of using earnings (Y2)o n









11Proposition 2 conveys two important messages, one direct and another indirect. The direct
message is that the comparison of relative R2 is exactly the right question for a rm that is con-
sidering replacing earnings with EVA in its performance measurement and incentive system. The
more subtle message is that while this simple approach gives an incorrect quantitative assessment
of the value of using earnings and EVA together, it generally gives the right ordinal message about
whether or not EVA is valuable as a performance measure in isolation. The reason is that the
two approaches dier only in that the optimal weighting approach takes account of the correlation
between the two measures, an issue that is of course irrelevant if only one measure will be used. In
addition, the two approaches give similar rankings of EVA versus earnings because the correlation
between the two measures has the same eect on the value of each.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Hypotheses tested
There are two fundamentally dierent approaches to empirically testing the theory. The rst would
be to test whether rms pay their managers as if they understood and applied the theory inde-
pendently of whether or not they had explicitly chosen to adopt EVA or a related performance
measure. This would be related to recent empirical work by Bushman et al (1998) and Krolick
(1998) who compare the importance of standard accounting measures in explaining stock prices
and in explaining compensation. Both studies nd evidence consistent with our model in that
measures which are more important in determining stock prices are also more important in com-
pensation. As the authors recognize, the results of Gjesdal (1981) imply that the relationship need
n o th o l di nt h e o r y . O u rProposition 2 provides a credible theoretical rationale for why the Gjesdal
(1981) critique need not hold in practice, so that the value of accounting numbers in valuation and
stewardship can in fact be closely related.
Both Bushman et al (1998) and Krolick (1998) use well-established measures such as return
on assets, earnings, and so forth. By contrast, we focus on a relatively novel development in
performance measurement, EVA. A conceptual problem with a compensation test of our theory is
that we would be estimating the sensitivity of pay to measures, such as EVA, which many rms do
not explicitly use in compensation. While one could defend the test by asserting that rms should
nonetheless act \as if" they were using EVA, we adopt the more direct approach of explaining which
rms explicitly adopt EVA or a related performance measure. We begin with the lists of adopters
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including Lexis/Nexis, ABI/Inform, and The Wall Street Journal Ondisc databases over 1985-
1994 (Wallace) and 1986-1994 (Hogan and Lewis) for keywords including Economic Value Added,
Residual Income, Economic Value Management, Economic Prot, Value Based Management, and
Market Value Added. We add to these lists the adopting rms identied by Kleiman (1999), who
searched the Compact Disclosure database for the words EVA and Economic Value Added. The
three lists had an overlap of over 80%, and we only require a rm to appear in one of the sets to
be deemed an \adopter".
Hogan and Lewis (1999) and Kleiman (1999) look for evidence of performance improvements
following the adoption of EVA or a related measure; Kleiman (1999) nds strong evidence of
stock return improvement but Hogan and Lewis (1999) nd no evidence of operating performance
improvements relative to the industry mean. By contrast, we wish to explain why rms adopt or
do not adopt such performance measures in the rst place. We ask whether rms are more likely
to adopt EVA or a related measure when our theory suggests it will be an ecient tool for incentive
contracting in that particular rm. Hogan and Lewis (1999) suggest an alternative view based on
their nding that performance improvements appear to be no better than for similar rms that did
not adopt the measures. They also argue that rms may simply time the adoption of these measures
to coincide with exogenous anticipated increases in performance. This hypothesis is intriguing,
but incomplete, as it does not explain why those other rms whose performance improved similarly,
did not also adopt EVA or a related measure.
4.2 Data
This section presents results from rms over the years 1986-97. Our longest possible time-period
starts in 1978 and our results are similar with this longer time-series. We use the shorter series
to reduce the chance of an underlying structural break. To derive our prior expectations for the
value-weight placed on alternative performance measures, we use standard accounting and stock
price data from Standard and Poors' Compustat and CRSP. These data were augmented with
estimates of Economic Value Added secured from the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. It is worth
noting at this point that we use the publicly reported EVA numbers from Stern Stewart to capture
the value of such measures. This may understate the value of these measures, as we miss the
detailed rm-specic adjustments that Stern Stewart performs for its clients.
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics of our sample. Abnormal stock returns are esti-
13mated assuming a beta of one and using the NYSE value-weighted index as the market portfolio as
in Biddle et al (1997). Results are essentially identical using rm-specic betas from CRSP. The
sample size is just under 6800 observations, which represents the universe of rms which appear in
the Stern Stewart Performance 1000 list as well as CRSP and COMPUSTAT for at least two years
of our sample period. Two years are required because we use changes in both stock values and
accounting performance measures to compute our optimal weights. We do this in order to remove
(as far as possible) the eect of anticipated performance from stock returns, and also to avoid the
non-stationarity of data in levels.
As is common with panel data on large companies, Table 1 indicates some large outliers in
both accounting performance measures and stock returns. To reduce the eects of such extreme
observations, we rst removed all rms with less than ve years of data.16 We then winsorize all
our values at the 1% tails before performing our statistical analyses. That is, if an observation
falls outside the 1% condence interval at either tail, we set it equal to the upper or lower bound
of that interval.
4.3 Firm-Level Data
To compute the correlations that underlie our calculation of the value-added by EVA, we use
abnormal stock returns and innovations in EVA and earnings. We follow Biddle et al (1997) in
dividing our accounting measures by lagged market value of equity as this provides consistent
scaling with stock returns. Finally, we use an AR1 specication to identify innovations in the
accounting numbers, similar to Biddle et al (1997). As expected, our results are similar but noisier
if we use simple rst dierences to proxy for unexpected changes in earnings or EVA.
Standard contract theory requires that performance measures be tailored to each rm's specic
circumstances. Moreover, the decision to adopt or not to adopt EVA is certainly a rm-level
decision. As Kleiman (1999) reports, EVA adoption shows some clustering in the manufacturing
sector (industry codes 2000-3999). However, even at the 4-digit industry level, there are only three
industries in which more than 90% of the rms (weighted by sales or assets) have adopted EVA. In
our theory, the weights that are to explain the decision to adopt EVA are in turn computed using
rm-specic statistical correlations. With at most 12 years of data on each rm, we will inevitably
have noisy measures of the relevant correlations and variances. We can extend the series to 19
years for a subsample of rms, but this heightens the prospect of an underlying structural break.
16Our results are similar if we increase the required number of years to ten, or reduce them to four.
14Our results are similar with our full sample.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our rm-level data. The rst two rows present
results similar to Biddle et al (1997); earnings tend to have a higher correlation with stock returns
than does EVA. The third row shows that the two measures are signicantly correlated with one
another on average, indeed somewhat more so than with the stock price. In terms of our model,
this last nding implies that the measurement errors "1 and "2 tend to covary positively, an issue
which is accounted for explicitly in our computation of the value of EVA. It is also important to
note that a non-trivial number of our correlations are negative, an issue that does not appear in
previous studies which estimate the relationship between EVA, earnings and abnormal returns for
large pooled cross-section and time-series of data. While the theory does not restrict the correlations
to be positive, we describe below how we handle these values in computing the value of EVA.
T h en e x tr o wi nTable 2 summarizes our dummy variable indicating whether or not a rm has
adopted EVA. The low average value reﬂects rst the fact that previous research has identied 78
total adopters, of which 47 had six years of full data from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and Stern Stewart.
The year of adoption is also indicated in the previous studies, but we were unable to exploit this
information because of (a) a lack of sucient data on either side of the adoption year, and (2) a
lack of a dynamic theory indicating exactly when rms should be expected to adopt EVA. The
next two rows of Table 2 summarize our alternative ap r i o r imeasures of the relative contracting
value of EVA versus earnings. The average percentage reduction in contracting noise from using
EVA is over 15%, but the median value is zero. Since most rms have not in fact adopted EVA,
the large proportion of rms for which the value-added of EVA is zero provides the rst piece of
evidence that is consistent with the prediction of our model. Moreover, the average fraction of
EVA adopters in the 283 rms where our theory says EVA is of no value is just under 2.5% while it
is nearly 14% in the remaining 257 rms. This suggests that actual adoption decisions bear some
relation to our theoretical predictions, an issue we investigate systematically in the next section.
There are three reasons for our conclusion that the median rm gains nothing from using EVA.
First, there are many cases where earnings has a higher correlation with stock returns than does
EVA, and the two are not themselves highly correlated. Second, there are a signicant number
of cases where EVA has a small or even negative correlation with stock returns and a relatively
high correlation with earnings. In this case, the theoretically optimal response would be to place
negative weight on EVA, using it in much the same way one would use an industry performance
index. While the intuition is compelling, it is dicult to imagine rms using EVA or earnings
15in this way; for this reason we restrict the weights on earnings and EVA to fall between zero and
one. There are also cases where EVA has only a small or negative correlation with earnings, but
a negative correlation with abnormal returns. In these cases, we set the value-added of EVA to
zero as it is a perverse performance measure.17 Finally, in the 17 cases where EVA is positively
correlated to stock returns but earnings are negatively correlated, we set the fraction of value-added
of EVA to 100%. We adopt similar conventions for the computation of relative R2 values.
The last ve rows of Table 2 summarize a set of control variables which may also aect the
decision to adopt EVA. Size may aect the adoption decision if there are xed costs, but it is readily
conrmed that there are very few small rms that satisfy all our data requirements. It is also worth
noting that the organizational costs of adopting EVA should also increase with size so the eect of
size is ap r i o r iambiguous. More highly leveraged rms may have less demand for EVA since a
larger fraction of their capital costs are in the form of interest payments. Put another way, highly
levered rms may already run a \tight ship" (see Jensen (1989)) and so gain little from additional
performance incentives. High values of Tobin's q may either reﬂect good performance, in which
case the demand for EVA may be less, or may capture growth rms for whom the measurement
of EVA is more problematic. Finally, rms with more tangible assets may gain more from careful
management of capital, or it may be in more mature industries in which EVA is more valuable.
We also experimented with a set of operating and stock market performance measures to allow for
the possibility that rms with poor recent performance are motivated to adopt EVA. Consistent
with the ndings of Hogan and Lewis (1999) and Kleiman (1999), there is little dierence in the
prior performance of adopters and their industry counterparts.18
4.4 Theoretical and actual adoption of EVA
Table 3 presents simple correlations between the alternative measures and the adoption of EVA or
a related performance measure. None of our explanatory variables shows a signicant univariate
Pearson correlation coecient with the decision to adopt EVA. As expected from the expressions in
Propositions 1 and 2, the value of EVA under the optimal weighting scheme is positively correlated
with the relative R2 of the two measures. The correlation is barely signicant at the 10% level,
however. This is problematic because as argued earlier (see Proposition 2), relative R2 is the
right measure if rms truly abandon all other performance measures when adopting EVA, while
17A direct application of our theoretical formula mis-handles such cases because all correlations are squared.
18Kleiman (1999) nds that stock price performance improves after the adoption of EVA, but there is no dierence
before adoption or in operating performance.
16our percentage value-added is the right measure if rms manage to combine EVA with previously
available earnings-based measures. The mathematical expressions for the two dierent measures
suggest that their ranking may be more highly correlated than their numerical values, and this is
buttressed by the problem of some major outliers in the R2 measure. Consistent with this, the
Spearman rank correlation between relative R2 and percentage value-added is over 85%. Since
we wish to allow for the possibility that rms can either adopt EVA exclusively, or combine it
with existing measures, we adopt an approach similar to that of Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999)
study of the relationship between the variance of stock returns and their use in CEO compensation.
Specically, we use the cumulative distribution function of the percentage value-added by EVA as
our primary dependent variable. Firms for whom EVA adds zero value thus receive a value of zero
and those for whom EVA improves incentive eciency by 100% receive a weight of 1. As Aggarwal
and Samwick (199) stress, this approach has the useful property of being less sensitive to outliers
in either method of gauging the value of EVA.
Both of our cardinal measures of the value of EVA are positively correlated with both rm size
and leverage and negatively correlated with Tobin's q and the fraction of tangible assets. None
of these correlations are large enough to raise much of a multicollinearity issue and none of our
key results are sensitive to the choice of regression controls. The remaining correlations in Table
3 are fairly standard; leverage is positively related to size and negatively related to Tobin's q,a n d
Tobin's q is signicantly lower with greater rm size. The only surprising correlations are with
the fraction of tangible assets being negatively related to leverage and positively related to Tobin's
q. The correlations are generally not large and probably reﬂect the fact that we are estimating a
univariate relationship over a large sample of rms covering essentially all industries.
Table 4 presents regression estimates of the relationship between our estimates of the value
added by EVA and actual adoption decisions. The rst two columns present logit estimates of
the probability that the rm adopts EVA with an indicator variable for adoption as the dependent
variable. The data present problems of both heteroskedasticity and correlated errors. To reduce
heteroskedasticity, we rst weight the data by the square root of the number of observations we
have for each rm. We compute our standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimator
available on the Stata
R 
Statistical package. We also allow for the residuals to be correlated
within SIC industries; the reported results only allows correlation at the 4-digit level, but results
are minimally aected by using either the 2- or 3-digit level.
The results tend to support the theory that rms take account of the signal and noise content of
17EVA in deciding to adopt this measure for performance evaluation and compensation. Firms that
have a relatively high value-added of EVA are signicantly more likely to be those among rms that
adopt the system. The only other signicant determinant of adoption is the fraction of tangible
assets. None of the other controls have any discernible eect on the adoption decision, perhaps
partly due to correlation between them and to the fact that we have a large and heterogeneous
sample. We also experimented with non-linear specications of the controls (including their rank)
with similar results.
The overall explanatory power of the regressions is modest, delivering the realistic message that
we still have much to learn about the value of EVA and rms motivations for adopting it. As
noted by Kleiman (1999), there are some industry patterns to adoption and to control for these
eects we used 25 industry dummies; 6 for industries outside manufacturing (SIC 2000-2999) and
the remainder making ner distinctions between the industries in manufacturing that comprise the
bulk of EVA adopters. As expected, these dummies raise the explanatory power of the estimate
a n dt h e ya l s ot e n dt ostrengthen the marginal eect of our estimated value-added of EVA.
The last column of Table 4 pursues further the issue of industry eects. In this table we group
the data by 4-digit SIC industry. We use the sales-weighted fraction of adopters in each industry
as the dependent variable, and then add one and take the log to provide a continuous measure that
is not heavily inﬂuenced by outliers. We pool all the return and accounting data by industry in
computing the correlations and variances that underlie our estimate of the value-added of EVA, and
average the remaining controls over each rm-year in each industry. We have over 200 industries,
and with 540 rms this implies that many industries will have only a single rm. While our results
are similar for coarser industry groupings, signicance levels fall as we lose degrees of freedom. As
with the rm-level estimates, we weight the data by the square root of the number of observations
underlying each industry estimate and compute robust standard errors. The results are consistent
with the previous rm-level results.
The economic signicance of our key result is not immediately apparent due to the logistic
transformation of the adopt/not adopt dummy variable. At the median level of EVA value-added,
the probability of adoption is just under 8%. Using the estimated coecient from the rst column,
a rm that is in the upper quartile of value-added by EVA will adopt it with probability 13.4%. A
rm in the lower quartile will adopt with a probability of only 4.64%. The results carry through
more strongly for more extreme values; rms at the 95th percentile of value-added according to
our theory will adopt with a probability over 30%, while those at the lowest 5 percentile will adopt
18with probability less than 1.7%. These eects are particularly gratifying given the design of our
experiment. First, our estimates of the value-added of EVA are just that, estimates. They involve
a non-linear transformation of three correlations and three variances estimated from particularly
small samples. Thus, the value of EVA is estimated with an error that is not zero, but is otherwise
dicult to characterize. Second, our controls do not seem to do a very good job in accounting
for dierences in the costs of adopting EVA. These costs may even be time-varying, as more is
learned about the value and properties of EVA over time. Even a simplistic \follow-the-leader"
theory would predict the clustering of EVA-adoption by industries that we observe in the data (see
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). Unlike our model, however, such a story would
not predict which industries should feature EVA adopters and which should not. Nonetheless, our
predictive power could presumably be improved with a more complete dynamic model.
While some of our empirical problems are inevitable given the theory and the subject under
study, we hope to achieve improved estimates by including relevant controls. While we have
controlled for the \usual suspects" of rm size, Tobin's q, leverage and so forth, we would like
to identify variables which test the hypothesis that EVA is adopted by rms based on fads or on
the opportunistic timing on the part of managers, as suggested by Hogan and Lewis (1999). Our
theory focuses exclusively on the use of EVA in an ecient incentive contract, and it would be
extremely valuable to test this idea against plausible alternatives.
4.5 Additional information on adopters versus non-adopters
Tables 5-7 present some evidence intended to supplement the statistical work and to suggest al-
ternative hypotheses and controls. For Table 5, we select eight prominent rms for which we have
the full 12 years of data, two in each of the following categories: (i) rms which the model correctly
classies as adopters, (ii) rms which the model correctly classies as non-adopters, (iii) rms which
the model incorrectly classies as adopters, and (iv) rms which the model incorrectly classies as
non-adopters. These rms are particularly inﬂuential in our results, meaning that they either t
our theory very well or very poorly. It is important to note that none of the statistical conclusions
are fundamentally changed by the inclusion or exclusion of these or any other specic rm.
In Table 5, Subsample A presents four rms that our theory classies correctly. Olin is a
diversied chemicals company that we correctly classify as an adopter given the high correlation
between EVA and returns, coupled with a low correlation between earnings and returns. The other
rm in Olin's 4-digit industry is Monsanto, also an EVA-adopter that shows a substantial (39%)
19improvement from using EVA. The other correctly identied adopter gives some sense of the range
of rms that we identify; the telephone service provider Sprint shows a nearly 60% reduction in
performance measurement noise from using EVA. For Sprint, the correlation between earnings and
returns is about average but that with EVA is extremely high, and the correlation between the two
measures is high but not as high as might be expected.
Our theory correctly identies Amgen as a company where EVA should not be adopted. It
is highly correlated with earnings and is far less able to explain stock returns. As might be
expected for such a heavily traded biotech company, neither accounting measure is particularly
highly correlated with stock returns. In terms of the model, this means either that forward-looking
value captured by Yf is very important, or the stock price is moved by the non-fundamental factors
summarized in our price error . Our theory also correctly identies Boeing as a non-adopter
since EVA is actually negatively related to stock returns. Interestingly, Davis (1996) reports that
Boeing considered adopting EVA but decided that it was incapable of taking account of their long
production lead times and large, lumpy order ﬂows. The data certainly are consistent with Boeing's
impression that EVA might penalize their managers for value-adding decisions.
The next four rms in Table 5, reported as Subsample B, are incorrectly classied by the model.
We include them to provide a sense of balance and also to suggest new theoretical directions that
might be followed. First, our data strongly suggest that Oce Depot should be an EVA adopter,
which it is not. The reason is clear; EVA is a fairly good predictor of returns while earnings
surprises move in the wrong direction. To remind us that industry eects are not the sole or even
the primary driver, we note that Sterling Software is also an incorrectly classied non-adopter.
Both these rms are small relative to the sample average, but this pattern does not seem to be a
sample-wide phenomenon. There is also an outstanding 3-digit industry (331) that we incorrectly
classify as one that should be full of adopters. This is the Steel Manufacturing industry, and
includes Bethlehem Steel and US Steel. None of the rms in this industry have adopted EVA
despite the fact that EVA has a positive and signicant relationship with returns, while earnings
is small and negative.
The next two incorrectly classied rms reminds us that correlation with returns is not the sole
reason why rms adopt EVA. According to our estimates, EVA is a perverse performance measure
for Hewlett-Packard but they are nonetheless recent EVA adopters. It is possible that performance
declines pushed this move, but we were unable to detect any systematic pattern of this sort in the
data. Finally, Tektronix is a rm that despite its high-tech industry classication is actually one
20where stock returns are closely related to earnings innovations but not to positive surprises in EVA.
Tables 6 and 7 complete our picture of how EVA varies by industry. Two conclusions can
be drawn from these data. First, the value of EVA as derived from our incentive model (see
Propositions 1 and 2) varies signicantly across rms. Second, and more importantly, the adoption
or non-adoption of EVA is not driven by any obvious industrial characteristic such as capital-
intensity or maturity. We take a dierent tack; we start with basic incentive theory, build in some
real-world complications, and use the information contained in stock prices. To this end, we have
some success in predicting and isolating instances where EVA is used. The industry-level data in
Tables 6 and 7 do not reveal any obvious alternatives.
5 Concluding Remarks
Not surprisingly, given the dollar amounts at stake, there is now a substantial practitioner and
applied literature attempting to assess the value of EVA and related \shareholder value-based"
performance measures. Most such studies focus on the strength of the statistical relationship
between alternative measures and the rm's stock price. This paper begins with the more funda-
mental, and previously unaddressed, question: What is a good objective measure of the value of
these new performance metrics? We rst conrm that it is easy to construct models, and easier
still to provide verbal arguments, in which the practice of relating accounting measures to stock
returns is misguided or useless (a point originally made in Gjesdal (1981)). We show, however,
that this conclusion is driven at least in part by a common and implausible assumption of formal
agency theory that all the relevant attributes of alternative performance measures are known and
directly observable. When we relax this assumption, we nd substantial value in the debate over
which measure is more closely related to stock prices. We also nd important heterogeneity in the
statistical relationship, a heterogeneity which bears some relationship to rms' decisions to adopt
or not to adopt one of the new performance measures. Thus, the relevant applied question appears
to be not so much whether EVA beats earnings per se, but under what circumstances does EVA
beat earnings, and why?
Our paper also presents a formal empirical structure for testing the model of Paul (1992). Past
research, such as Sloan (1993), nd that accounting measures of performance continue to explain
changes in compensation even when stock returns are included as an explanatory variable. This
is consistent with the Paul (1992) model in that rms do not use exactly the same weights as
21the stock market in determining compensation. We advance the literature by ascertaining the
relative weights that rms should use in a realistic setting where we do not know all of the relevant
attributes of alternative performance measures ap r i o r i . More surprisingly, we show that the
apparently simplistic idea of comparing the relative ability of alternative measures to explain stock
returns, is both theoretically defensible and a reasonable representation of practice.
226 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify the analysis, denote by Ψk the scaled measure that the rm chooses to use. In the
case where the rm uses only earnings, Ψk =Ψ 2, and in the case where the rm optimally uses
EVA in addition to earnings, Ψk =Ψ 
c. Finally, denote by c the weight that the rm places on
this scaled measure, and  the weight on the (ltered) price. Since the performance measures are
freely contractible, it is convenient to orthogonalize the stock price to the accounting measures of
performance. We construct a \ltered price" Pf as in Kim and Suh (1993):
Pf = P − E(Xc + Xf j Y1;Y 2)
so that Pf is orthogonal to our two measures of current performance. The rm then chooses the
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The rst part of the Proposition is that the value of using EVA (Y1) monotonically increases
in the dierence Va r(Ψ2) − Va r(Ψ
c). A sucient condition for this is that maximized rm value
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and the fact that both c and  are optimally chosen so that @Γ
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The remaining parts of the Proposition refer to expressing the dierence in variance in terms









, j 2f 1;2g. We can therefore write,




















The level of value-added from using EVA can be expressed as Va r(Ψ2) − Va r(Ψ
c), where













































































It can also be shown that the optimal weights γ
1 and γ
2,f r o m
w(Y1;Y 2;P f)=W + γ1Ψ1 + γ2Ψ2 + [P − E[PjY1;Y 2;Y f]],
depend only on simple correlations. First, recall that with wages written as above, we need to
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Combining terms, we see that
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The expression above is helpful in addressing the validity of using R2 to assess a performance
measure's value in incentive-based compensation.
With γ
1 and γ
2 expressed in terms of observables, we see that the only other terms in the
value-added expression are Va r(P), which is observable, and g, which is not. However, using (8),
we see that the percentage value-added from using EVA is











































which depends only on simple and observable correlations. 
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
If we re-dene Ψk =Ψ 1,w h i c hi sE V A ,Proposition 1 immediately implies that the value of using


























Observe that this is simply the ratio of the individual R2's between each of the candidate measures
and the stock price. 
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28Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Raw Data
Mean Median SD Min Max
Total Assets 3.27 1.34 15.7 0.0854 1175
Market Value of Equity 5.14 1.83 11.3 0.0696 240
Earnings before Extraordinary Items 0.0578 0.0677 0.254 -7.99 3.65
EVA -0.0452 -0.006 0.261 -8.53 1.17
Raw stock returns % 23.6 17.5 44.5 -89.4 1396
Abnormal stock returns % 7.49 3.47 36.2 -91.6 1015
Notes: Sample is 7031 rm-years, from 1986-1997. All dollar gures are in billions. Stock returns are
in percentages. Abnormal stock returns are raw returns less the contemporaneous return on the S&P 500
value-weighted index.
29Table 2: Descriptive Statistics at the Firm Level
n Mean Median SD Min Max
Earn;AR 540 0.331 0.383 0.332 -0.67819 0.884
EV A;AR 540 0.126 0.126 0.344 -0.81520 0.854
EVA;Earn 540 0.389 0.484 0.431 -0.89621 0.978
EVA Adoption Dummy 540 0.0870 0 0.271 0 1
Percentage value-added from adopting EVA 540 0.167 0 0.282 0 1
Relative R2; 2
EV A;AR=2
Earn;AR 540 855 0.167 1004 0 24078
Number of Observations for each rm | 10 11 1.53 6 11
Total Assets ($ millions) 540 8457 2307 22517 115 240783
Long-Term Debt
Total Assets (Leverage) 540 0.597 0.584 0.184 0.103 0.993
MV of Equity + BV of L-T Debt +Preferred Stock
Total Assets (q) 540 1.38 1.213 0.852 0.847 6.48
Property, Plant and Equipment
Total Assets (Tangible) 540 0.478 0.508 0.243 0 0.942
Notes: EV A;AR denotes the Pearson correlation coecient between innovations in EVA as a fraction of
lagged market value of equity, and abnormal stock returns. Earn;AR is dened the same way for earnings in
place of EVA, and EVA;Earn is the correlation between innovations in EVA and in earnings. The percentage
reduction in variance is computed with weights on EVA and on earnings restricted to be nonnegative. Total
Assets, Leverage, q, and Tangible are all averaged over all available years for each rm. Lastly, MV stands
for Market Value and BV stands for Book Value.
199% of correlations are negative.
2024% of corrrelations are negative.
2110% of correlations are negative.























R2 of EVA -0.0129 0.130 1
Log Assets
0.0144 0.0817 0.0398 1
Leverage
0.0106 0.119 0.0759 0.588 1
Tobin's q
-0.413 -0.0262 -0.0626 -0.447 -0.650 1
Tangible
Assets 0.0876 -0.0791 -0.0791 -0.198 -0.323 0.121 1
Notes: Sample drawn from 540 rms.
31Table 4: Regression Results Explaining the Adoption Decision
Logit Regressions Explain Firm-Level Adoption Dummy, OLS explains log of






Constant -4.207* -5.53* -0.247
(0:961) (1.04) (0.263)
C.D.F of Value-Added 2.315* 2.543* 0.000247**
by EVA (0:519) (0.579) (0.000120)
Total Assets -1.55 E-5 -1.24 E-5 3.20 E-6
(1.68 E-5) (1.64 E-5) (5.20 E-6)
Tobin's q -0.286 -0.390 0.00470
(0.322) (0.296) (0.0134)
Leverage 0.259 0.839 0.0428
(1.17) (1.17) (0.0438)
Prop., Plant & Equip 1.542** 2.20* 0.0902***
to Total Assets (0.718) (0.739) (0.486)
Number of observations 540 540 201
R2 (pseudo-R2 for logit) 0.0725 0.128 0.0442
Notes: Sample is 540 rms, weighted by the square root of the number of observations for each rm.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the logit analysis we allow errors to be correlated within 4-digit
industries but not across industries. * indicates dierent from zero at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%.
32Table 5: Some Illustrative Cases
Subsample A: Some Firms Correctly Classied by the Theory
Firm SIC % Value-Added EV A;AR Earn;AR Earn;EVA Assets Leverage Tobin's
by EVA q
Olin Corporation 2800 93.2 0.480 0.158 0.792 1995 0.627 0.838
Sprint 4813 57.7 0.543 0.353 0.637 12438 0.702 1.05
Amgen 2836 0 0.180 0.294 0.972 1374 0.291 3.97
Company
Boeing 3771 0 -0.253 0.401 0.011 19660 0.562 1.03
Corporation
Subsample B: Some Firms Incorrectly Classied by the Theory
Firm SIC % Value-Added EV A;AR Earn;AR Earn;EVA Assets Leverage Tobin's
by EVA q
Oce Depot 5940 93.2 0.251 -0.405 -0.425 1821 0.590 1.71
Sterling 7372 57.7 0.840 0.017 0.243 541.3 0.530 1.29
Software
Hewlett- 3570 0 -0.120 0.418 -0.162 16632 0.457 1.48
Packard
Tektronix 3825 0.912 0.171 0.605 -0.034 1068 0.512 0.899
Corporation
33Table 6: Value and Adoption of EVA
Percentage Reduction in Variance and Percentage of Adopters by 1-Digit SIC Industry




0100-0199 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4 25.2 0
1000-1999 Mining, Construction 31 10.2 6.45
2000-3999 Manufacturing 294 14.3 10.1
4000-4999 Transportation, Utilities 37 13.8 10.8
5000-5999 Wholesale & Retail Trade 71 22.5 7.04
6000-6999 Financial Services 57 26.0 2.23
7000-8999 Miscellaneous Services 46 12.2 9.0
34Table 7: Value and Adoption of EVA
Percentage Reduction in Variance and Percentage of Adopters by 2-Digit SIC Industry




20 Food and Kindred Products 26 32.6 11.5
21 Tobacco Products 1 2.2 0
22 Textile Mill Products 6 17.6 0
23 Apparel and Other Fabrics 3 9.5 0
24 Lumber and Wood 4 17.8 0
25 Furniture and Fixtures 5 13.4 9.1
26 Paper and Allied Products 19 11.6 10.5
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied 20 18.4 10.0
28 Chemical and Allied 53 14.6 5.6
29 Petroleum Rening 13 23.0 7.3
30 Rubber and Plastics 9 18.0 22.2
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete 3 6.1 0
33 Primary Metal 10 31.6 10.0
34 Fabricated Metal 9 5.9 11.1
35
Industrial and Commercial Machinery
and Computer Equipment
34 18.6 14.7
36 Electronic and Other Electrical 27 5.4 7.4
37 Transportation Equipment 22 17.7 9.1
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling 27 11.1 18.5
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 3 26.0 0
35